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EVIDENCE-BLOOD TEST EvIDENCE HEIi AmissiBn WITHOUT
SHOWING OF CHAIN OF POSSESSION BUT HOLDIMG LimITED To
CIVIL OASES
In a civil action in which intoxication was in issue plaintiff sought to
introduce the results of a blood test which indicated that plaintiff's decedent
was intoxicated at the time of the fatal accident. The trial court excluded
this evidence for lack of a sufficient foundation for admissibility because
no one could testify of his own knowledge that the specimen remained un-
changed during its transportation from a hospital refrigerator in which it
had been stored overnight to the laboratory where it had been tested.
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed this ruling,' relying on the additional
ground that plaintiff had not negated the possibility of alteration of the
specimen by third persons during the time it was in the hospital re-
frigerator.2 On further appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and
granted plaintiff a new trial, saying that the blood test evidence should have
been admitted because plaintiff had established a foundation sufficient for
admissibility in a civil case. The court added, however, that its decision
should not be construed to set a similar standard for admissibility in crim-
inal cases. Woolley v. Hafner's Wagon Wheel, Inc., 22 Ill. 2d 413, 176
N.E.2d 757 (1961).
A party seeking to introduce the result of a blood test must negate
the possibility that the specimen was either accidentally altered or wilfully
tampered with between the times of taking and testing.3 Prerequisite to
such proof of identity is the establishment of an unbroken chain of posses-
sion: no interval may go unaccounted for,4 and every person who handled
the specimen must testify that it was not tampered with while in his
custody 5 and that the procedures he used precluded the possibility of ac-
cidental alteration.6 Nevertheless, courts have considered certain intervals
lWoolley v. Hafner's Wagon Wheel, Inc., 27 Ill. App. 2d 1, 169 N.E.2d 119
(1960).
2 Id. at 10, 169 N.E.2d at 123.
8 See Hershiser v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 102 Neb. 820, 170 N.W. 177 (1918);
DONIGAx, CHEmiCAL TESTS AND THE LAw 62-67 (1957); cf. People v. Lesinsld,
10 Misc. 2d 254, 171 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
4 E.g., Greenwood v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 996 (D. Ky. 1951) (civil case);
People v. Sansalone, 208 Misc. 491, 146 N.Y.S2d 359 (County Ct. 1955) (criminal
case).
5 See Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 527, 90 S.E.2d 257 (1955); State v.
Weltha, 228 Iowa 519, 292 N.W. 148 (1940) (dictum) (prescribing standards and
summarizing the law).
6 See DONIGAN, CHEMICAL TESTS AND THE LAW 56-62 (1957).
(895)
896 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.110
in the chain of possession sufficiently free from the possibility of alteration
or tampering to warrant the conclusion that the specimen remained un-
changed throughout the period,7 and in states where the Uniform Business
Records as Evidence Act has been adopted, some courts have accepted, in
lieu of a showing of continuous possession, records indicating that the
specimen remained unchanged while it was in the custody of the testing
laboratory.8
A proper weighing of the factors that determine the admissibility of
results of blood tests for intoxication must take into account the unusual
characteristics of such evidence. It is easily susceptible to accidental alter-
ation through carelessness in taking, storing, or testing, and to wilful
tampering by intermeddling litigants. In addition, the mechanics of cal-
culating alcoholic content will greatly magnify even a slight change in the
condition of the specimen, whatever its cause. 9 Further difficulty with the
mechanics of calculation arises if the specimen is not taken immediately
after the event for which intoxication is relevant because of the questionable
validity of the assumption of a uniform rate of oxidation of alcohol in the
blood stream."" Despite these weaknesses, the test result is surrounded
with a scientific aura that usually carries great weight with the jury. Al-
though the reliability of blood tests for intoxication is not often openly
questioned, 1 courts seem to be reluctant to compound the danger of sus-
pected unreliability when identification is also suspect.'2 This reluctance
has led to an admissibility requirement that is tantamount to a presumption
that alteration has occurred unless the proponent of the evidence can show
that it did not. This approach would seem to be justified, however, only
when there is a real possibility of accidental alteration or wilful tampering.
Accordingly, in the present case the court deviated from the customary
rule and admitted the test result in spite of a possibility of tampering or
alteration. The chain of continuous possession had been twice broken:
plaintiff failed to account for the interval during which the specimen was
stored in the hospital refrigerator and the interval of transportation from
the hospital to the laboratory. However, these gaps were offset by evidence
7 Schacht v. State, 154 Neb. 858, 50 N.E.2d 78 (1951) (rebuttable presumption
of no tampering in United States mails); Piester v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 436,
277 S.W.2d 723 (1955) (laboratory refrigerator).
8 Nichols v. McCoy, 38 Cal. 2d 447, 240 P.2d 569 (1952) (applying CAL. CiV.
PRoc. CODE §§ 1953e-h) ; cf. Wheeler v. United States, 211 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019 (1954) (applying similar federal statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1732(a) (1958)). But cf. People v. Wyner, 207 Misc. 673, 142 N.Y.S.2d 393
(County Ct. 1955) (records unauthenticated).
9 See Ladd & Gibson, Legal-Medical Aspects of Blood Tests to Determine
Intoxication, 29 VA. L. REv. 749, 751-54 (1943). See generally DoNiGAN, CHEmICAL
TE sTs AND THE LAW 18-43 (1957).
10 See authorities cited note 9 supra.
11 For a case questioning the reliability of a "drunkometer" to determine per-
centage of alcohol in blood, see People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W.2d 322 (1949).
12 See Hershiser v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 102 Neb. 820, 170 N.E. 177 (1918);
Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 527, 90 S.E.2d 257 (1955).
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tending to show that the hospital refrigerator was in the "sole control" of
the testing laboratory 13 and that the specimen was transported by one of
two laboratory employees.14 In addition, plaintiff introduced testimony
that the procedures of the laboratory produced results relied on by the
medical profession and the community at large in making decisions crucial
to life and health.15 Having found this evidence satisfactory to negate
the possibility of accidental alteration, the court implicitly rejected the
traditional presumption of alteration by holding the blood test evidence
admissible. The decision seems to have been grounded on a con-
sideration of three criteria which should govern the allocation of the
burdens of proof of nonalteration of blood samples. These are the suffi-
ciency of the reputation and professional reliability of the testing laboratory
to negate the possibility of accidental alteration, the ease with which evi-
dence of wilful tampering can be discovered, and the degree of control
which the litigant can exercise over the procedures of the laboratory.16 In
most cases, a balancing of these factors would indicate that the burden of
raising a suspicion of alteration during the time the specimen is in the
custody of the testing laboratory can properly be put on the party opposing
admission. 17 If this were the rule, the proponent would still have to demon-
strate a chain of continuous possession until the specimen came into the
hands of the testing laboratory and the laboratory's adherence to proper
procedures, but would be relieved of proving an entire chain of possession.
The court explicitly limited the application of this approach to civil
cases, rationalizing the limitation by citing the different standards of
proof that must be met in the trial of the ultimate issue in criminal and
civil cases.' 8 The well-established rule is, however, that the standards
governing admissibility are the same for civil and criminal litigation.19
Since the court stated that any weakness in the proof of nonalteration
13 Woolley v. Hafner's Wagon Wheel, Inc., 27 Ill. App. 2d 1, 10, 169 N.E.2d
119, 123 (1960) ; see note 7 mspra and accompanying text.
14 Instant case at 416, 176 N.E.2d at 759.
15 Ibid.
16 Instant case at 418-19, 176 N.E.2d at 760.
17 Evidence that the laboratory had been broken into, that a stranger had handled
the specimen, that the laboratory procedures safeguarding the sample were not up
to professional standards, or that the proponent had some measure of control over the
testing laboratory should be sufficient to place on the proponent the burden of negating
the possibility of alteration by showing the traditional chain of possession.
18 Instant case at 418-19, 176 N.E.2d at 759-60.
19 1 WIGmoRE, EVmENCE § 4, at 16 (3d ed. 1940) ; see, e.g., Crawford v. State,
112 Ala. 1, 21 So. 214 (1895); State v. Cooper, 2 N.J. 540, 67 A.2d 298 (1949).
Some courts have even rejected a distinction between proof sufficient to satisfy a
reasonable man and proof sufficient to satisfy a reasonable man beyond a reasonable
doubt when directing a verdict for a criminal defendant or determining the correct-
ness of a guilty verdict. E.g., United States v. Castro, 228 F.2d 807 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 940 (1956); United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594
(2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726 (1944); see Pierce v. United
States, 252 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1920). Contra, Riggs v. United States, 280 F.2d 949
(5th Cir. 1960); People v. Pavluk, 386 Ill. 492, 54 N.E.2d 567 (1944); People v.
Franczyk, 315 Mich. 384, 24 N.W.2d 87 (1946).
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should go to the weight given the evidence rather than its admissibility,
20
it had no reason to exclude in criminal cases blood test evidence whose
reliability is supported by evidence similar to that in the present case; the
civil-criminal distinction can be preserved on the question of sufficiency.2 '
A result approximating the court's limitation of the new standard to
civil cases could have been reached by reference to the considerations which
dictated its change of the civil standard. Thus, when the specimen is tested
in a police laboratory, the possibility of accidental alteration is not so easily
offset by reputation evidence as it is when the specimen is tested in a
medical laboratory; the reliance of an independent medical profession on
medical laboratories for decisions affecting life and health has no coun-
terpart in the case of police laboratories. Again, it would be more difficult
for a party to prove wilful tampering by enforcement officials in a police
laboratory than to show similar tampering on the part of a civil litigant
in a medical laboratory.22 Finally, since the police laboratory is within the
control of the party which normally seeks to introduce the results of tests
performed there, it is not unreasonable for the courts to demand higher
standards of the police in keeping records of the safeguards used to assure
that blood samples remain unaltered. This seems particularly true in view
of the facts that the police laboratory, unlike its medical counterpart,23
does much of its testing with an eye toward litigation and that the courts
have traditionally exercised a measure of control over police practices.
2 4
Since the burden of creating a suspicion of change in the specimen should
not be put on a party opposing admission-particularly a criminal defend-
ant-unless evidence of possible tampering or careless alteration is reason-
ably discoverable, a court would seem warranted in requiring a showing of
continuous possession in cases in which the specimen has been tested by a
police laboratory. But this rule should not be limited to criminal cases;
whenever a police laboratory has made the test or there has been a show-
ing that the testing medical laboratory is unreliable in reputation or pro-
cedures or under the control of the party seeking to introduce the results
of the test in evidence, a similar showing of continuous control seems
proper. On the other hand, when a criminal defendant wishes to introduce
the results of a police laboratory test, it would seem unjust to allow the
prosecutor to suggest that the procedures or security of the police labora-
tory were inadequate, particularly since the prosecution would be in an
excellent position to discover any alteration or tampering that did occur.
Courts might therefore want to distinguish between the requirements to
be imposed on a criminal prosecutor and on a criminal defendant on the
20 Instant case at 419, 176 N.E.2d at 760.
21 See note 19 supra.
22 The likelihood of wilful tampering may, however, be more remote in police than
in medical laboratories, since enforcement officials theoretically have no interest in
the outcome of subsequent prosecutions and have the experience to prevent non-
officers from entering the laboratory.
23 See instant case at 418-19, 176 N.E.2d at 760.
24 See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 341-44 (1943).
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basis of the amount of control that each class of litigant can exercise over
the police laboratory. Thus, the varying admissibility standards do not,
logically, turn on the nature of the litigation but on the factual variables of
the competence of the testing laboratory, the likelihood and detectibility
of wilful tampering, and the relative ease of proof of facts by the different
parties. The present court's realistic approach to a reformulation of the
admissibility standard achieves a proper result on its facts, but need not,
and should not, have been limited to civil litigation.
HIGHWAYS AND STREETS-NEw YORK EMINENT DomAin
STATuTE DOEs NOT AUTHORIZE GENERALt CONDEMNATION OF EASE-
M NTS FOR BITBoARD REGULATION
After several unsuccessful attempts to obtain authority from the legis-
lature to undertake a comprehensive program of billboard regulation,' the
New York Superintendent of Public Works asserted authority to condemn
negative easements to forbid the erection of signs visible from state high-
ways under section 30 of the New York Highway Law,2 which confers
upon him a general power of eminent domain. He adopted a broad series
of prohibitive regulations based, in part, on criteria totally unrelated to
those enumerated in the eminent domain statute.8 Plaintiff, the owner of
land visible from a limited access highway, brought suit to challenge con-
demnation of such easements on his property 4 The County Court of
Sullivan County denied the state's motion to dismiss the complaint and the
Appellate Division reversed, holding that the regulation had a reasonable
relation to the improvement of safety within the meaning of the statute.;
The Court of Appeals in turn reversed, four to three; it held that the legis-
lature had not intended the eminent domain statute to give authority for
general billboard regulation but merely to centralize in the superintendent
powers previously exercised by the counties. To reach its holding, the
court used two rules of statutory construction, ejusdem generis and the
principle that narrow construction should be given to eminent domain
statutes. It bolstered its conclusion by noting the restricted scope of exist-
ing statutes regulating billboards and by pointing out that certain provi-
sions of the superintendent's broad set of regulations were in any event not
1 Bills were introduced unsuccessfully in the New York legislature four times
betveen 1952 and 1960. Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y.2d 249, 254, 176 N.E.2d 817,
818, 219 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (1961).
2 N.Y. H'WAY LAWS § 30.
3 Some criteria were the physical appearance of the signs, the legality of the
activity advertised upon them, and the extent to which they defaced natural features
of the landscape. Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y.2d 249, 257, 176 N.E.2d 817, 819, 219
N.Y.S.2d 241, 244 (1961).
4 The action was brought pursuant to N.Y. REAL PRoP. LAWs § 500.
5 Schulman v. People, 11 App. Div. 2d 273, 203 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1960).
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calculated to "improve safety." Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y.2d 249, 176
N.E.2d 817, 219 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1961).
Early in this century, the courts represented a major obstacle to bill-
board regulation. They regularly held that statutes relying chiefly on
aesthetic criteria fell outside the traditional scope of the police power-
health, safety, and morals-and therefore amounted to unconstitutional
taking of property. 6 With the decline of reliance upon substantive due
process courts have had less difficulty linking billboard legislation to the
police power 7 and, as the intermediate holding in the instant case shows,
8
this permissiveness probably extends equally to the use of the eminent
domain power to accomplish similar ends.9 While many states have taken
advantage of this judicial relaxation to enact limited statutes regulating
billboards in specific areas,1 only a few have prohibited all signs within a
6 Curran Bill Posting & Distrib. Co. v. City of Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac.
261 (1910); Crawford v. City of Topeka, 51 Kan. 756, 33 Pac. 476 (1893); Bill
Posting Sign Co. v. Atlantic City, 71 N.J.L. 72, 58 Atl. 342 (Sup. Ct. 1904) ; People
v. Green, 85 App. Div. 400, 83 N.Y. Supp. 460 (1903); Bryan v. City of Chester,
212 Pa. 259, 61 AUt. 894 (1905).
Even during the heyday of substantive due process, some courts were willing
to expand the traditional police power rationale to support regulation that was
essentially aesthetic. See St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis,
235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911), appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 761 (1913). The court
there said that billboard regulation is related to health (because billboards obstruct
light and air and the areas behind them are used as privies and dumps), safety (be-
cause billboards are fire hazards, can be blown over by strong winds, and are hiding
places for criminals), and morals (because billboards provide concealment for
prostitutes and immoral acts).
7 See Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAw &
CONTEMP. PRoD. 218 (1955); Rodda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes
Under the Police Power, 27 So. CAL. L. RTv. 149 (1954). More recent cases indi-
cate judicial approval of billboard regulation. E.g., Murphy, Inc. v. Town of
Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944) ; New York State Thruway Authority v.
Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961);
Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5 (1932). A few courts have said
that the police power may be used to gain aesthetic objectives. General Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935),
appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936) ; Preferred Tires, Inc. v. Village of Hempstead,
173 Misc. 1017, 19 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct 1940); Commonwealth v. Trimmer, 53
Dauph. 91 (Pa. Quarter Sess. 1942). Some billboard statutes are related to aesthetics
on their face. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 120-5-12 (1953) ("unsightly" signs);
IDAHO CODE AN. § 18-7017 (1948) (advertising on rocks and similar natural
objects); NEv. REv. STAT. § 405.050 (1957) (billboards which may "measurably
destroy the natural beauty of the scenery").
8 Schulman v. People, 11 App. Div. 2d 273, 275-76, 203 N.Y.S.2d 708, 711-12
(1960).
9 Billboard regulation under eminent domain would probably be sustained today
by most courts. Comment, Outdoor Advertising Control Along the Interstate High-
way System, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 796, 811 (1958) ; cf. Belovsky v. Redev. Authority,
357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947); Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 188
Mass. 348, 74 N.E. 601 (1905) (dictum); Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Phila-
delphia, 242 Pa. 47, 56, 88 AtI. 904, 907 (1913) (dictum). Compare Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954). The Supreme Court there suggests that con-
demnation on aesthetic criteria, when part of an elaborate urban redevelopment
scheme, is not an unconstitutional taking of property. The concept of "public use,"
to which the exercise of eminent domain power is limited, has been considerably ex-
panded in recent years. See Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain:
An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949).
10 E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5286; N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAws § 361-a; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit 36, § 655.2 (1961) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-298 to -321 (Supp. 1960).
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proscribed distance-normally very short-from the highway," and none
has gone so far as to authorize administrative regulation over all signs
visible from the highway. Attempts to do so have met with vigorous
opposition from pressure groups representing the outdoor advertising in-
dustry.' 2  In contrast, all states have found it necessary to enact statutes
delegating broad eminent domain power to administrative officials in order
to facilitate the construction and maintenance of safe and effective high-
ways.' 3 Many of these statutes describe only in general terms the uses
in behalf of which the eminent domain power may be exercised.' 4 How-
ever, when a statute does contain specific criteria, they invariably relate
to engineering needs such as the removal of obstructions,15 straightening
of curves,' 6 or access to rock quarries.' 7  None of the statutes provides for
administrative discretion to regulate billboards or improve the drivers'
scenic view. The only previous attempt to improvise broad billboard
control on the basis of a typical highway eminent domain statute was cut
short in Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n.'8 The Ohio Supreme Court,
finding no legislative intent to confer such authority, there struck down an
attempt by the Ohio Turnpike Commission to condemn the right to erect
billboards visible from the roadway on the basis of a grant of broad eminent
domain power.19 The present case confirms the hostility of the courts
to any attempt by the executive to sidestep the problems of obtaining effec-
tive legislation in this area.P°
Section 30 of the New York Highway Law grants to the superin-
tendent power to appropriate easements:
"E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13-145 (1958) (billboards within 15 feet
of highways prohibited outside thickly settled areas); Dsf.. CODE ANN. tit. 17,
1108(a) (2) (1953) (billboards prohibited within 25 feet of all highways); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 23, § 142 (Supp. 1961) (billboards prohibited within 50 feet
of all highways).
12For a discussion of these groups and their activities, see Price, Billboard
Regulation Along the Interstate Highway System, 8 KAN. L. REv. 81-91 (1959).
13 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13-145 (1958) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 138
(1953); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §46(1) (1950); UTAH CODE ANN. §27-2-9
(Supp. 1961).
14E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 84, § 10 (1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §953
(1961).
I
5 IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-118 (1949).
16ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, § 4-501 (Smith-Hurd 1960).
17ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-155(A) (Supp. 1961).
18 162 Ohio St. 86, 120 N.E.2d 719 (1954).
'9 The court went on to point out that even if the legislature had intended such
authority, the particular regulation adopted-based on the standard of visibility-
was too vague and variable to be enforceable. Id. at 93, 120 N.E.2d at 723.
20 The court in the present case relied in part on the fact that the legislature
had failed to pass general billboard regulation and had limited its legislation to
regulating specific projects, e.g., N.Y. CONSERv. LAWS § 675 (state parks and park-
ways); N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAWS § 361-a (New York Thruway); N.Y. PUB. AUTH.
LAWS § 569(b) (Whitestone Bridge and Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel). This was an
unfortunate additional rationale for it is doubtful that any conclusion should be drawn
from legislative inaction. Further, the court ignored the fact that the bills which
failed of passage did not provide for compensation. There is no reason to assume
that the legislature would not authorize the regulation with compensation of that
which it had failed to regulate without compensation.
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necessary for the construction, reconstruction and improvement
of state highways . . . including the appropriation of property
for drains, ditches, spoil banks, gravel pits and stone quarries;
also for the removal of obstructions, improvement of sight dis-
tances . . . and for other purposes to improve safety conditions
on the state highway system.
Whether the legislature intended this statute as authority for general
billboard regulation hinges on the interpretation which it gave to the word
"safety." Many courts, including the New York Court of Appeals, 21
have been willing to uphold statutes specifically regulating billboards on the
ground that they are reasonably related to the promotion of safety.
22
However, these decisions, in which the courts, by paying lip service to
"safety," 2 in effect expanded the police power to cover aesthetic ends,
do not answer the question of whether an eminent domain statute which
makes safety a ground for condemnation was intended as authority for gen-
eral billboard regulation. Since it is unlikely that the legislature actually
considered billboards when it passed the statute in question," the problem
posed in the present case was whether the danger created by billboards
falls within the type of danger against which the legislature intended to
provide. Undoubtedly, a sign blocking a clear view of the roadway ahead
would constitute such a danger, and the superintendent would be able to
condemn it under section 30.2 5 But it is highly questionable, however, that
the kind of danger afforded by the distraction of reading a sign-if, indeed,
such a danger actually exists 2 0 -is similar enough to the type of "obstruc-
tions" referred to in the statute to be reasonably treated as within the .legis-
lative intention. An eminent domain statute relating to engineering prob-
lems is not of a broad "constitutional" nature,2 7 to be stretched with chang-
21 New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, 10 N.Y.2d 151,
176 N.E.2d 566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961). The court also mentioned aesthetics and
articulated a novel rationale for billboard regulation along new highways, based on
the power of a state to take away a value which would not have existed except for
the state's building of the highway.
2 2 See cases cited note 7 supra.
23 See St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137
S.W. 929 (1911), appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 761 (1913), discussed in note 6 supra.
24 In view of the fact that the legislature chose to specify certain uses for which
property might be condemned and of the well-known rule that eminent domain statutes
are to be narrowly construed, e.g., United States v. 64.88 Acres of Land, 144 F. Supp.
29, 32 (W.D. Pa. 1956), revld on other grounds, 244 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1957);
Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 104 Ohio St. 447, 454, 135 N.E.
635, 637 (1922) ; Lazarus v. Morris, 212 Pa. 128, 131, 61 At. 815, 816 (1905), it is
likely that had the legislature intended to regulate billboards, it would have said so
specifically.
25 N.Y. H'WAY LAWS § 30 authorizes condemnation "for the removal of ob-
structions."
26 See Price, supra note 12, at 88. The author points out that billboards may
alleviate monotony and boredom and thus actually contribute to driving safety.
27 See note 24 supra; cf. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344,
359-60 (1933) : "As a charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions."
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ing technology beyond the concepts which underlay its original enactment.
The pressures and needs which spurred its passage are in sharp contrast
to the conflicting interests which have often stymied general billboard
regulation. The court in the present case followed sound judicial process
in leaving the billboard controversy to the legislature,2 8 which has the
powers of investigation peculiarly suited to handle such problems of con-
flicting community interests.
29
NARCOTICS-IPEREoE IN FEDERAL STATUTE IMPLYING GuILT
FRom FACT oF UNEXPLAINED POSSESSIONT CAN BE APPLIED TO AN
AIDER AND ABETTOR OF SAn WITHOUT SHOWING OF PossEssIoN
Appellant,1 on behalf of a group of conspirators, had helped to ar-
range a sale of illegally imported narcotics to a federal agent and had re-
ceived payment for the drugs from the agent. Although the statute which
forbids the sale of narcotics requires specific knowledge that they were
illegally imported, proof of possession of drugs-not itself a crime-is
28 Subsequent to the decision of the present case, the probleni passed back to
the legislature by the court of appeals was taken up in two proposed bills. One,
suggested by the New York Department of Public Works, undertook to supply the
missing legislative intent by amending the eminent domain statute to cover bill-
boards. N.Y.S. 3010 (1962). The other sought to create an independent system
of regulation through licensing under the police power. N.Y. Ass. 3354 (1962).
29 With an increasing public demand for regulation, see Price, supra note 12,
at 87-91, and a decline in the importance of billboards as an advertising medium,
see Dukeminier, supra note 7, at 233-34, legislative enactment of comprehensive con-
trol of billboards seems more likely. While regulation under the police power would be
less expensive and more expeditious than condemnation, see Comment, supra note 9,
at 812 rn.118; 13 SYRACUSE L. REv. 325, 327 (1961), condemnation may be the only
means effectively available in states in which constitutional limitations on the use
of the police power for aesthetic purposes exist, see Powers, Control of Outdoor
Advertising, 38 NEB. L. REv. 541, 550 n.20 (1959), or when opposition of land-
owners, in contrast to outdoor advertisers, threatens the passage of the proposed
legislation. The degree to which even landowners would be placated depends on
the amount of compensation which would be available to them, which, in turn, de-
pends on what is considered the owner's compensable interest in the land. The
right to be seen from outside one's land is an easement, Klaber v. Lakenan, 64 F.2d
86, 90 (8th Cir. 1933); First Nat'l Bank v. Tyson, 133 Ala. 459, 477, 32 So. 144,
149 (1902); Yale Univ. v. City of New Haven, 104 Conn. 610, 620-21, 134 Ati.
268, 272 (1926), and the state courts, with one exception, see Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick,
113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 572 (1943), have held that this easement may be transferred
from a landowner to an independent advertiser. E.g., Murphy, Inc. v. Town of
Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944) ; United Advertising Corp. v. Board of
Adjustment, 136 N.J.L. 336, 56 A.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1947). However, there is some
belief that the compensable interest may extend only to the right to advertise activi-
ties conducted on the premises. Comment, supra note 9, at 811, 817-18. Should con-
demnation be chosen as the method of regulation, the expense could be alleviated
by federal funds obtained under § 131 of the Federal Interstate Highway Act, 72
Stat. 904 (1958), 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1958), which allows grants of 90.5% of the
cost of acquiring by condemnation the advertising rights along the interstate highway
system-although the problem of the expense of condemnation along other state high-
ways would, of course, remain.
1 This Comment is concerned only with the affirmance of the conviction of the
appellant Santore on one of four counts on which ,he was convicted. In all, the
opinions in the present case involved the appeals of eight persons convicted on one
or more of five separate counts, all concerning violations of federal narcotics statutes.
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sufficient to sustain a conviction for their sale if the defendant is unable
to explain his possession.2  Appellant was convicted despite the absence of
evidence that he had ever come into physical possession of the drugs. On
appeal, at a rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the conviction, three of the judges advancing the theory that the
possession of a principal in a sale may be imputed to an aider or abettor
who knows of the possession.3 United States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 51
(2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 834 (1961).
The inference of guilt permitted by the statute to be drawn from the
proven fact of possession 4 does not expressly relieve the prosecution of the
burden of proving guilt-including knowledge of illegal importation-be-
yond a reasonable doubt. It does, however, allow a conviction to stand
when the evidence would not otherwise be deemed sufficient to uphold a
finding of guilt.5 The scope of the permissible inference has been expanded
through the judicial interpretation of "possession" to include constructive
possession, so that a finding of dominion and control over the possessor
of the drugs has been held sufficient to sustain convictions.6 In some cases
the common-law definition of constructive possession has been expanded
270 Stat. 570 (1956), 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1958):
Whoever . . . receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates
the transportation, concealment, or sale of any . . . narcotic drug after being
imported or brought in, knowing the same to have been imported . . . into the
United States contrary to law . . . shall be imprisoned . . . and, in addition,
may be fined ....
Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is shown to
have or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains
the possession to the satisfaction of the jury ...
3 Judge Lumbard formulated this view, and Judge Moore concurred. In a con-
curring opinion, Judge Smith agreed that this was the proper interpretation of the
statutes. However, all three of these judges also found that there had been sufficient
evidence of all other elements of the offense, including knowledge of illegal impor-
tation, to justify the conviction. Judge Friendly voted to affirm on, the ground that
there was sufficient evidence that appellant actually knew that the drugs had been
imported illegally, but agreed with Judges Waterman and Clark, who voted for
reversal, in excepting to the view proposed by Judge Lumbard. Judges Friendly,
Waterman, and Clark thus maintained the more conventional position that appellant
must have had at least constructive possession for his conviction to be sustained
in the absence of a showing that he knew the drugs had been smuggled. See Harris
v. United States, 359 U.S. 19, 23-24 (1959); United States v. Landry, 257 F.2d
425 (7th Cir. 1958) (admission of ownership of drugs is not proof of possession).
4Although the statute authorizes conviction on proof of possession without any
other evidence, it does not compel that result. See Caudillo v. United States, 253
F.2d 513, 518 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 931 (1958). The statute has been
said to create a twofold presumption that the drugs were imported contrary to law
and that the defendant knew it, Copperthwaite v. United States, 37 F.2d 846 (6th
Cir. 1930); Mathes, Jury Instructions and Forms for Federal Criminal Cases, 27
F.R.D. 39, 168 (1961); Comment, Narcotics Regulation, 62 YALE L.J. 751, 768
(1953), or a single presumption that one in possession has performed every element
of the offense, Jackson v. United States, 250 F2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1957). In one
case it was said that possession created a presumption of guilt. United States v.
Johnson, 260 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 909 (1959).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 277 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1960) ; United States v.
Malfi, 264 FTd 147 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959).
6 E.g., Rodella v. United States, 286 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 889 (1961); Brown v. United States, 222 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1955).
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in turn so that convictions have been sustained even though the degree of
dominion and control shown has been somewhat meager.7 A high point
in this trend was reached in the Second Circuit case of United States v.
Hernandez,8 in which it was stated that one who is so associated with per-
sons having physical custody of narcotics as to have no difficulty in arrang-
ing delivery to purchasers has achieved the required dominion and control.9
In 1941 the same court, in United States v. Cohen,10 had formulated an
alternate means to extend the scope of the statute's permissible inference
by holding aiders and abettors 11 responsible for the possession of any other
participant in the transaction.' 2 Though Cohen was widely cited in subse-
quent cases, the terms of its test were not followed since the drawing of an
inference of the guilt of an aider and abettor was never permitted unless
the defendant had also been found to be in constructive possession of the
narcotics.13 The present case adopts the Cohen doctrine 14 but limits its
7 Cellino v. United States, 276 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1960) (defendant introduced
purchaser to seller, vouched for seller's trustworthiness, and attended consumma-
tion of sale); United States v. Moia, 251 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1958) (defendant an-
swered phone calls from buyers and informed buyer of place of delivery).
8290 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1961).
9 Id. at 90. This case was heard on a petition and cross-petition for a rehearing
after the conviction had already been reversed on questions of law concerning the
trial judge's duty to read the minutes of the grand jury, 282 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1960).
On rehearing it was stated that failure to charge the jury beyond the general lan-
guage of the statute so as to explain the meaning of possession to include constructive
possession was reversible error. 290 F.2d at 90. However, it does not seem possible
that such error could have been to the defendant's disadvantage.
1o 124 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 811 (1942).
"1 See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
12"[I]t was not necessary that each of the defendants should have had the
narcotics, but only that one or more of them had possession while the others aided
in the illicit transaction . . . ." 124 F.2d at 165. As authority for this proposition
the court cited two liquor law cases, Vilson v. United States, 61 F.2d 901 (9th Cir.
1932), and United States v. Hodorowicz, 105 F.2d 218 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 584 (1939). Since in the first case the court found both actual possession
and aiding and abetting the possession of others and in the second the court found
constructive possession, neither supports the holding in Cohen.
a E.g., Alexander v. United States, 241 F.2d 351, 356 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 940 (1957); United States v. Chiarelli, 192 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952). Although concerned with aiding and abetting,
Cohen has recently been quoted in a conspiracy case as support for the proposition
that where the conviction is for conspiracy to sell drugs, the possession of one
conspirator is to be deemed the possession of all. Valentine v. United States, 293 F.2d
708, 712 (8th Cir. 1961). The Valentine case seems to be based on the same
general theory approved in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), that
all conspirators are liable for the act of one of them done in furtherance of the
conspiracy. In the instant case, Judge Smith cited Pinkerton as support for the
proposition that under the narcotics statute, the possession of one "partner" in the
sale should be deemed the possession of all major participants therein. Instant case
at 82. His view would extend the vicarious liability doctrine of conspiracy cases to
prosecutions under the aiding and abetting statute and render aiders and abettors
liable for all acts incident to those which they assist.
14At the trial level, the instant case had been heard by a judge without a jury;
and since there is no indication that that court had found Santore guilty as an aider
and abettor, it would seem fhat the aiding and abetting rationale of his conviction
was first propounded to the court of appeals. Had the trial in the instant case
been before a jury, the jury charges would have had to include instructions on
aiding and abetting before the conviction could be affirmed on that basis. Nye &
Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1949).
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application to principals who have knowledge that one of the group has
actual possession. 15 Accordingly, it was stated that the possession of one
of the group would not be attributed to mere "facilitators." 16
In a prosecution for aiding and abetting the violation of a criminal
statute, the defendant need not be shown to have performed all the acts
constituting a violation, because the acts he purposefully advises or assists
are attributed to him.17 However, when a statute requires specific knowl-
edge as an element of the offense, it has been held that one aiding and
abetting a violation cannot be held criminally liable unless it is shown that
he personally had that knowledge.' Such holdings seem premised on the
assumption that aiding in the commission of certain acts does not provide
a rational basis for attributing to the aider the knowledge of the principal,
even though assistance may, in other cases, serve as a basis for attributing
responsibility for the acts of the principal. The statute in the present case
requires specific knowledge of illegal importation, an element of the offense
often most difficult to prove.' 9 However, although the court in the present
case could not have directly imputed this knowledge to an aider and abettor,
it reached the same result by imputing possession to the defendant and
thereafter applying the statute's unique permissive inference. In the proc-
ess, the court not only lost touch with the rationale of the cases refusing to
impute specific knowledge to an aider and abettor but also failed in the ex-
ecution of its legalistic sidestep. Although it imputed an act-possession-
it did so on the basis of evidence showing aiding and abetting a sale of
drugs, not on the basis of evidence showing aiding and abetting of the fact
imputed-their possession. Appellant was not shown to have aided or
abetted anyone's possession.20 Since there was no basis for imputing pos-
session to appellant, the statute's inference seems clearly inapplicable.
Whether the means used to facilitate convictions under § 2(c) of the
Narcotics Drug Import and Export Act is that of the court in Cohen and
15 Later Second Circuit cases have misstated this criterion as requiring only
proof of possession by another defendant, and then refused to follow such a test.
United States v. Monica, 295 F.2d 400, 402 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
953 (1962); United States v. Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1961).
x6 Instant case at 78.
17 Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1954) ; Massicot v. United States,
254 F.2d 58, 65 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958); United States v.
Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938).
18 Johnson v. United States, 195 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1952) (conviction for aiding
violation of statute prohibiting interstate transportation of stolen autos with knowl-
edge of theft reversed on ground appellant had no knowledge car was stolen); cf.
United States v. Gardner, 171 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1948) (agreement to cause inter-
state transportation of fraudulent checks without knowledge of forgery held not
to constitute criminal conspiracy); Linde v. United States, 13 F.2d 59 (8th Cir.
1926) (receipt of stolen auto, without knowledge of interstate transportation held not
to warrant conviction of conspiracy to receive stolen autos from interstate commerce).
29 See, e.g., United States v. Rheams, 257 F.2d 842, 843 (2d Cir. 1958); United
States v. Feinberg, 123 F.Zd 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 801
(1942).
2 0 Even if appellant had aided and abetted someone else's possession, the fact
that possession itself is not "an offense against the United States" would preclude
another's possession from being attributed to him under the terms of the aiding and
abetting statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
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the present case-allowing the imputation of possession and hence knowl-
edge of illegal importation to aiders and abettors in the sale of narcotics-
or that of the court in Cellino v. United States 21 -rejecting Cohen 2 but
permitting a finding of constructive possession on a most tenuous showing
of dominion and control-, the application of the permissive inference ex-
tends its scope beyond that arrived at by a literal reading of the statute's
words, which permit an inference of guilt to be drawn only from the fact
that defendant himself had possessed the drugs. In the present case, this
extension was said to be made in deference to congressional intent: 23 in
selecting the fact of possession, easily susceptible of proof, to be the one
from which an inference of guilt might be drawn, Congress indicated a
desire to facilitate narcotics convictions. However, three considerations
militate against this extension of the statutory language. First, it seems
improper, particularly in construing a criminal statute, to reason that be-
cause Congress chose to ease the task of the prosecutor in narcotics cases
by allowing him to take advantage of one clearly stated inference, it also
intended to give him the benefit either of a broad reading of that inference
or of the use of similar nonstatutory inferences. Second, as is succinctly
stated by Judge Learned Hand in his partial concurrence in the initial
court of appeals opinion in the present case, Congress was capable of at-
tacking constructive as well as actual possession of narcotics if it chose to
do so.24 And finally, by the terms of the statute itself it is clear that
Congress also intended to make it possible for the accused to show that he
did not obtain possession in such a way as to be put on notice that the
drugs had entered the country illegally.25 The defendant clearly would
be deprived of this defense if the inference were applied when the drugs
were shown to have been in the custody of a person over whom he had
no control.26
21276 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1960). The court in United States v. Mills, 293 F2d
609 (3d Cir. 1961), stated in dictum that Cellino "goes as far as reason and fairness
permit in inferring dominion and control." Id. at 611. In White v. United States,
294 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1961), although the conviction was reversed on other grounds
and remanded, proof that either defendant or another person with the same name
had told witness where heroin might be found was held to be sufficient evidence to
support a finding of constructive possession.
22276 F.2d at 944-45. The court stated that the evidence in Cohen would sup-
port a finding that all those convicted in that case had been in possession of the
drugs involved. Nevertheless, a close reading of the Cohen opinion fails to reveal
any mention of evidence that defendant Angelson actually possessed the drugs or
had any control over them.
23 See instant case at 77.
2 4 Instant case at 70-71.
25 It has been stated that a defendant must show that he came into possession
lawfully, Howard v. United States, 75 F.2d 562, 564 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 295
U.S. 740 (1935); and that his possession must be for a totally legitimate purpose,
Comment, Narcotics Regulation, 62 YALE L.J. 751, 768 (1953). But it would seem
to be a more reasonable interpretation that defendant need only show that his pos-
session was in ignorance of the specific knowledge required and thus innocent under
this particular section. This view has been adopted in two cases. United States v.
Feinberg, 123 F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 801 (1942);
United States v. Turner, 65 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1933).
26 Although the defense itself might tend to be illusory in that the trier of fact
need never accept nor make any specific findings rejecting the defendant's explana-
1962]
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Nevertheless, it seems proper to extend the definition of possession to
include constructive possession when it can be shown that the defendant
actually used other persons whose conduct he could control in order to
avoid actual contact with the drugs; here it is the "mind" rather than the
"tool" who can probably best explain the possession of the drugs and whose
conviction Congress probably intended to facilitate. But, although the
Supreme Court, in finding the inference of section 2(c) not a violation of
due process, held that it was common knowledge that practically all
narcotic drugs are imported,27 thus suggesting that it would be constitu-
tionally permissible to allow an inference of guilt from proof that the de-
fendant had any dealings with drugs, this does not mean that the statutory
permissive inference was intended to apply to aiders and abettors in the
sale of drugs or to persons who had only tenuous dominion and control over
the drugs in question. This distinction has been ignored,28 and the court
has assumed that Congress intended to permit the drawing of an inferefice
of guilt from every fact situation in which it is constitutionally permissible
to do so. Such an assumption is supported neither by the statute's legis-
lative history 2 9 nor by its wording.30 Constitutional justification has been
confused with statutory construction in an attempt to give a liberal inter-
pretation to a criminal statute entailing severe penalties.3 1
TORT S-HUSBAND HAS CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON INJURY TO
His "MARITAL INTEREST" AGAINST 0. WHO PERF R s ABORTION
ON His WIFE WITHOUT HIS CONSENT
Plaintiff husband brought an action for damages against a physician
for an abortion performed on his wife ten years earlier. Defendant de-
murred on three grounds: first, that an action for the wrongful death of an
unborn child could not be brought in the absence of a survival of birth by
tion, the defendant seems at least entitled to have the judge or jury pass on his
explanation. Bradford v. United States, 271 F.2d 58, 62 (9th Cir. 1959) (dictum);
see United States v. Feinberg, supra note 25. One who merely delivers or stores
the drug under the orders of another may have no way of showing the origin of
the drugs, but at least would have the opportunity of showing that nothing con-
nected with his gaining possession put him on notice of illegal importation.2 7 Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925). See generally Note, Con-
stitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Presumptios, 55 COLUm. L. R'v. 527 (1955).
28 See instant case at 77.
2 9 The only legislative history connected with this statute when it was passed
in 1909 makes no mention of the intended scope of the permissible inference. H.R.
REP. No. 1878, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
30 The view has been advanced that Congress did not even intend to include
constructive possession within the meaning of possession in this statute. See United
States v. Landry, 257 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1958); instant case at 70 (L. Hand, J.,
dissenting).
31 A first offender "shall be imprisoned not less than five or more than twenty
years and, in addition, may be fined not more than $20,000. For a second or subse-
quent offense (as determined under section 7237(c) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954), the offender shall be imprisoned not less than ten or more than forty
years and, in addition, may be fined not more than $20,000." 70 Stat. 570 (1956),
21 U.S.C. § 174 (1958).
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the fetus; second, that the wife's consent was a complete defense to the
claim; and third, that the statute of limitations barred the action. The
court overruled the demurrer as to the first two grounds, holding that the
action was not for wrongful death, but for the invasion of a legally pro-
tectable "marital interest" in the unborn child, but sustained the statute
of limitations defense, granting plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to
show facts possibly tolling the statute. Touriel v. Benveniste, Docket No.
776790, Cal. Super. Ct., Oct. 20, 1961.
The fact situation in the present case offered the basis for several quite
different theories of recovery. Since defendant's wrong was of a highly
culpable nature, subject in California to serious criminal penalties,' a court
might adopt a policy of inflicting on such a defendant civil damages, which
would be essentially punitive rather than compensatory to the plaintiff,2
in an effort to deter the performance of abortions both directly and by
giving insiders to the operation a motive to reveal this personal and secre-
tive crime.3 Again, defendant in the present case inflicted dual injuries
which might be held compensible. He committed a battery upon the wife,
giving rise to a traditional action for assault and battery; 4 and he wrong-
fully caused the death of the fetus, creating a possible cause of action under
the wrongful death statute.5 The wife's action for assault and battery,
being personal to her, can be barred by her consent.6 The action for the
wrongful death of the fetus, however, is essentially derivative in nature,
7
accruing to whichever party is specified in the local statute.8 Although in
I CAL. PEN. CODE § 274.
2 See text accompanying note 23 infra. See generally Morris, Punitive Danz-
ages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 216 (1960).
3 See MoRRIs, TORTS 26 (1953). One writer has commented that probably no
felonious act is so free from punishment as criminal abortion. Fisher, Criminal Abor-
tion, in THERAPEUTIC ABORTIO" 3, 6 (Rosen ed. 1954).
4 See 1 HARPER & Jims, TORTS §§ 3.1-.5 (1956).
5 CAL. CIV. PRAC. CODE § 377; see Hale v. Manlon, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1962);
Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 434-35, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959).
I Cf. Sayadoff v. Warda, 125 Cal. App. 2d 626, 271 P.2d 140 (Dist. Ct. App.
1954). While there have been many cases involving abortions, only one can be said to
have necessarily held that a woman is not barred by her consent from maintaining a
cause of action against the abortionist. See Courtney v. Clinton, 18 Ind. App. 620,
48 N.E. 799 (1897). See generally Note, 45 ILL. L. REV. 395 (1950). The legal
maxims "volenti non fit injuria' and "ex turpe causa non oritur actio" would seem
to be the basis of the majority position. See id. at 397. Many of these same courts,
on the other hand, in cases where the woman died as a result of the abortion, have
allowed death actions to be maintained. See Kimberly v. Ledbetter, 183 Kan. 644,
331 P.2d 307 (1958); Milliken v. Heddesheimer, 110 Ohio St. 381, 144 N.E. 264
(1924). Such a policy of refusing to apply technical rules to an innocent party would
seem to apply just as readily to the situation presented in the instant case. But see
text following note 28 infra. The present case is, however, distinguishable in the
nature of the interest that is held to be compensable.
7 See Hale v. Manlon, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1962); Keyes v. Construction Serv.,
Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960) (by implication); Stidam v. Ashmore,
109 Ohio App. 431, 434, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959); Note, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
554, 557-58 (1962).
8 See 2 HARPER & JAmES, TORTS § 24.2 (1956). The California statute permits
the action to be brought by the heirs or personal representative of the deceased.
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 377.
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some states the birth of the fetus alive is irrelevant to such a cause of
action,9 in most a formal derivative theory is applied, and the statutory
beneficiaries are denied recovery when the child is stillborn, since the fetus
itself never had a cause of action.10 Finally-and the court based its opin-
ion on this theory-since the injury was to the offspring of a marriage,
recovery might be based on the invasion of what the court characterized
the "marital interest" of the husband. This "marital interest," essentially
sentimental, has received little express protection under tort law. There is
some recognition of it in the common-law actions for alienation of affec-
tions," criminal conversation,12 and loss of consortium.13 But in the more
closely analogous area of interference with the parent-child relationship,
recovery is not usually based-at least explicitly-on sentimental grounds,
but on loss of services.14 Although the action for abduction is sometimes
expressly held to lie regardless of economic loss, 15 a cause of action for
seduction is technically based on a loss of services or loss of right to
services,1 6 and in most states an action by a parent for alienation of the
child's affections is denied altogether.17 And when the harm to the child
is brought about by negligent conduct,. the parent's cause of action is also
commonly said to be based on economic loss.'8 In cases allowing recovery
for the wrongful death of minors, however, there has been a tacit recogni-
tion of the parents' sentimental interest; 19 in fact, the old rule limiting
9 See, e.g., Hale v. Manlon, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1962) ; Verkennes v. Corniea, 229
Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167
N.E.2d 106 (1959).
10 See Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951) ; Muschetti
v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 208 Misc. 870, 144 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct 1955) ; Howell v.
Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953). California is unique in having arrived at this
result through construction, see Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d
178 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954), of an independent statute dealing with the rights of a
fetus subsequently born, see CAL. Civ. CODE § 29, as controlling interpretation of the
wrongful death statute.
11 See Falk v. Falk, 279 Mass. 530, 181 N.E. 715 (1932); Tice v. Mandel, 76
N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1956); 3 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 683 (1938).
12 See Newcomer v. Ament, 214 Iowa 307, 242 N.W. 82 (1932); Antonelli v.
Xenakis, 363 Pa. 375, 69 A.2d 102 (1949) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 685 (1938). See
generally McCoRmIcK, DAMAGES § 112 (1935).
'3 See Massey v. Berlo Vending Co., 329 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1959) ; McCoRMIcK,
DAMAGES § 92 (1935).
14 See cases cited notes 16-18 infra. Some cases, however, have recognized the
"sentimental" interest involved. See Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W2d 543
(1949); Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650 (1930); Heck v. Schupp, 394
Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946) (dictum).
15 See Pickle v. Page, supra note 14; 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 700, comment d
(1938).
16 See Shaw v. Fletcher, 138 Fla. 103, 189 So. 678 (1939); Berghammer v.
Mayer, 189 Wis. 197, 207 N.W. 289 (1926) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 701, comment c
(1938). Compare Graham v. Smith, 330 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. App. 1959).
17 See Pyle v. Waechter, 202 Iowa 695, 210 N.W. 926 (1926) ; Miles v. Cuthbert,
122 N.Y. Supp. 703 (Sup. Ct. 1909) ; 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 699 (1938).
18 See, e.g., Fenerstein v. Board of Educ., 202 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Sup. Ct. 1960),
ag'd mere., 13 App. Div. 2d 503, 214 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1961). See generally McCoRmxcK,
DAMAGES § 90 (1935).
19 See Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960); Reed v.
Eubanks, 232 Miss. 27, 98 So. 2d 132 (1957); Stevens v. Schickendanz, 316 P.2d
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recovery by the representative of a minor to his pecuniary loss 2 -- which,
if strictly enforced today, when a minor is usually an economic liability,
would result in frequent foreclosure of recovery 2 1-- has been expressly
abandoned in several recent cases.2
Although a desire to punish the defendant physician for his culpable
conduct may have tacitly motivated it to reach its present holding-imposi-
tion of civil liability as a further deterrent to criminal misconduct is a recog-
nized subsidiary function of tort law 24-the language of the opinion reveals
that the court proceeded on a theory of compensating the plaintiff husband
for injury to an ill-defined "marital interest," in effect creating a cause of
action for a special kind of psychological suffering. Although a general
action for the intentional infliction of mental and emotional disturbance
has only recently begun to be recognized, 24 the common law unhesitatingly
allowed recoveries for emotional suffering when a third party intentionally
alienated the affections of a wife or committed adultery with her.2 5 The
readiness of the common law to recognize such actions, at least when the
intentional nature of the wrong justified a policy of quasi-punitive dam-
ages,2 6 can probably be traced to a belief that the intimacy of the family
relationship offers an objective standard in the otherwise subjective field
of psychological disturbances. That is, the difficult task of distinguishing
the true from the spurious claim of emotional damage 27 ---a major concern
of courts because of the absence of extrinsic evidence of most psychological
disturbances-is eliminated in the family context through what amounts to
judicial notice that, for example, a normal husband will always feel anguish
at the loss of his wife's love.28 But the very closeness of the family rela-
tionship, which lessens the likelihood of fraudulent assertions of suffering
1111 (Okla. 1957). See generally Hord v. National Homeopathic Hosp., 102 F.
Supp. 792, 794 (D.D.C. 1952), aff'd per curiam, 204 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1953):
The fact that "an infant . . . has not as yet developed any earning capacity . . .
[is] no reason for not awarding substantial damages . . . . Otherwise, the purpose
of the statute would be frustrated to that extent and a person who negligently caused
the death of an infant would be free of all liability. Such a result would be abhor-
rent and unjust. It would 'keep the word of promise to our ear, and break it to
our hope'."
20 See Thompson v. Town of Fort Branch, 204 Ind. 152, 178 N.E. 440 (1931);
Gill v. Laquerre, 51 RI. 158, 152 Atl. 795 (1931); McCoRMrcx, DAMAGES § 101
(1935).
21 See McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 101, at 354 (1935); WRONGFUL DEArT AND
SuRvivoRsHip § 3.3, at 65-66 (Beall ed. 1958).
22 See cases cited in note 19 .supra; 23 NACCA L.J. 123-24 (1959).
23 See PATTFRSON, ESsENTxAs OF INsuRANcE LAw § 58, at 264 (2d ed. 1957).
24 See 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 9.1 (1956).
25 See cases cited notes 11 & 12 supra.
26 See 1 HARPR & JAMES, TORTS § 8.3, at 613 (1956).
27 See 2 id. § 18.4, at 1032-33; PROSSER, TORTS § 37, at 176-77 (2d ed. 1955);
Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARv. L. RFv. 725, 733 (1937).
28 Not only might the court assume that it is always painful to a husband to lose
his wife's affections, it might also act on the belief that the husband was the object
of these affections in the first place. That both of these assumptions may be untrue
in many cases is somewhat less than completely material in view of the policy of
the courts to tighten the bonds of marriage.
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from the wrongful act, carries with it the opportunity for collusion, even
to the extent of staging the event which purportedly caused suffering in
order to trap an innocent party. In many states 29-California among
them 3 -this danger has led to so-called "heart balm" legislation, which
abolished the causes of action for alienation of affection and adultery.
Thus, the legislature has determined that the temptation for collusion out-
weighs the need to compensate for what is, in most noncollusive cases,
genuine emotional damage.31 When the public interest in deterring par-
ticular misconduct is greater, as it is in the case of criminal abortions, the
possible punitive aspect of the action-although ignored by the court in
the present case-would seem to tip the scale in favor of permitting the
husband to sue, once it is proven that the defendant committed the abor-
tion.3 2  Even in the hopefully rare case in which the husband and wife
were in collusion in denying that the husband had given his consent, the
victim of the collusion is not, as were the persons whose protection the
legislature sought to effect by the "heart balm" legislation, "innocent." 3 8
29 See 1 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs § 8.7 (1956).
3 0 CAL. Civ. CODE § 43.5.
31 Compare Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 298, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946).
32 Cf. Barton v. Bee Line, Inc., 238 App. Div. 501, 265 N.Y. Supp. 284 (1933).
83 This is literally true with respect to alienation of affections; even with respect
to adultery it may be suggested that public mores view that conduct far less harshly
than abortion.
If the policy of allowing recovery for the invasion of a "martial interest!' were
to become established, it could have important consequences in the analogous field
of recovery for the wrongful death of fetuses by serving as a convenient and logical
theory to assist in the interment of the formalistic requirement, found in many states,
that a fetus must survive birth in order to become the foundation for a wrongful
death action. See, e.g., cases cited in note 10 .upra. Since, when the infant sur-
vives birth even by a few minutes, a representative can maintain a wrongful death
action which, although historically based on economic loss, takes account of suffering
caused by thwarted expectancy, compare notes 18-22 .supra and accompanying text,
the rationale of the present case, which stresses the parent's suffering, would permit
like compensation of similar loss.
